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The analysis of Baltic regional trade patterns reveals that during the nineties the 
Baltic states made significant progress to integrate into the Western European 
division of labour although a significant share of (transit) trade with Russia 
remained. In view of this development, history seems to matter with respect to 
the interwar period and the period of Soviet occupation. In addition, a trade 
entropy analysis and gravity model estimates show that European integration of 
the Baltic states has a regional centre of gravity located in the Baltic Sea region. 
The Baltic trade flows increasingly follow the gravitational forces that generally 
shape trade relations, while regional integration is still much more important than 
it is normally the case. 
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At the end of the eighties, the overall collapse of the centrally planned economies 
in Central and Eastern Europe offered the chance to open the so far solely West 
European integration process for the emerging market economies. It became 
possible to complete the European integration process by a so called “Eastern 
Enlargement”. It started with Trade and Cooperation Agreements with the 
“pioneer reform countries” Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland soon followed 
by “Europe Agreements” signed in 1991, coming into force in 1994/95. The 
economic core elements of these agreements covered far reaching trade 
concessions such as an asymmetric opening of EU markets for industrial 
products from the associated countries and included steps towards a free 
movement of services, payments and investment capital. During the nineties, 
similar agreements were signed with further reform countries, totalling now ten 
countries waiting for EU full membership. The final stage of pre-accession was 
reached in 1998 when the first six applicant countries started accession 
negotiations with the EU. These negotiations were extended to another six 
applicant countries in 1999. 
In contrast, the participation of Soviet successor states in the Eastern 
Enlargement process is limited to trade agreements, with exceptions granted only 
to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The political independence of the former 
sovereign Baltic states was internationally recognized in autumn 1991 again — 45 
years after the Soviet occupation of these countries. Although starting rather late 
in the integration process compared to the “pioneer reform countries”, they 
managed to sign Europe Agreements in 1995 and Estonia was among the first 
applicant countries invited to accession negotiations in 1998. The Baltic 
“catching-up process” was completed by the invitation of Latvia and Lithuania to 





In view of this accelerated integration process, the question arises what makes 
the Baltic states so much different from the other Soviet successor states which 
still do not even dare to think about EU accession seriously. To answer this 
question this paper intends to elaborate the determinants of the Baltic process of 
economic integration and to show empirically in which way these determinants 
are reflected in the emerging patterns of trade. Based on this analysis an idea of 
the future role of the Baltic states in the European division of labour is 
developed. Accordingly, the paper is organized as follows: in section II 
theoretical approaches are discussed which help to explain the shaping of the 
direction of foreign trade and of economic integration resulting from trade 
relationships. In section III the development of the Baltic states’ regional trade in 
the decade after independence and the lines of economic integration are 
elaborated. In section IV the approaches of how to explain economic integration 
are applied to the regional trade patterns of the B altic states. The empirical 
analysis makes use of historical trade data, trade entropy indicators and a gravity 
model. Finally, in section V the results are summarized and the perspectives for 
further integration into the EU are discussed. 
II. Some Ideas on how to Explain the Baltic Trade Patterns 
The disintegration of the Central and Eastern European “Community of Mutual 
Economic Assistance” (COMECON) and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 
early nineties offered a chance for the Baltic States to find a new place in the 
international division of labour. The rearrangement of Baltic trade relationships 
that happened during the last decade can be attributed to a number of mutually 
interdependent determinants. Among them are the stepwise integration into the 
EU markets, the closer ties with other Baltic Sea countries, historical trade 





and the general globalization tendencies enhancing trade diversification. 
One answer to the question of how to explain emerging Baltic trade patterns in 
the years after independence can be derived from the ongoing EU integration: 
Due to their early efforts to integrate economically and politically into the EU, a 
shift of trade flows towards EU markets should have been expected. In general, 
countries participating in the same regional arrangement or preferential trade 
agreement (PTA) can be expected to trade more with one another than predicted 
by incomes, population and distance.12 PTA membership can create wholly new 
trade between member countries, but can also cause a substitution of trade with 
non-member countries by intra-bloc trade. It depends on the specific 
circumstances of a PTA whether trade-creating or trade-diverting effects are 
dominant and which kind of welfare effects they will have finally.13 
With a view to the Baltic States the central task is to analyse to what extent the 
free trade agreements with the EU contributed to the changing trade patterns of 
these again independent countries in the nineties. The answer to this question 
will be given by gravity model estimates. Moreover, it has to be examined 
whether the trade agreements with the EU fostered efficiency-reducing trade 
diversion or promoted the creation of new trade on balance.14  
                                         
12  To estimate the trade effects of PTAs a gravity model is usually applied which standard equation is 
supplemented by at least one dummy variable for PTA participation. While the basic variables in the 
gravity equation explain the normal trade between two countries in the absence of PTA, the dummy 
variable explains the trade which can be attributed to PTA participation. This approach is applied in 
e.g. Soloaga and Winters (1999), Eichengreen and Irwin (1996), Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) and 
Hamilton and Winters (1992). 
13  See Viner (1950: pp. 41) whose concepts set the fundament of the discussion on welfare effects of 
PTA’s (summarized in Bhagwati, Panagariya 1996). 
14  See e.g. the analysis of Wonnacott, Lutz (1989: pp. 74) who try to identify changes of trade patterns 





To be sure, the Baltic states’ stepwise integration into the EU does not imply a 
pure shifting of weights in trade relationships. Instead, the changing trade 
patterns indicate a far-reaching change of production structures closely linked to 
economic integration. For obvious reasons the question has to be answered 
whether this kind of structural change favours the economic development of 
small and peripheral countries like the Baltic states. As Krugman (1991a: pp. 83) 
and Krugman and Venables (1996) argue, peripheral countries are not necessarily 
the losers of economic integration. Following their line of thought, in the course 
of integration investors might prefer locations in a central region because of the 
good access to large markets (which typically characterize central regions) and 
the opportunity to realize economies of scale. The latter would foster a self-
sustaining concentration of producers and their suppliers in central regions from 
where they could serve the economic space as a whole. Centralization of 
production does not necessarily mean one central location because a polycentric 
geography of production with geographically highly concentrated industries 
could offer similar advantages. Such kind of concentration would further benefit 
from the reduction of transaction costs (transport, trade barriers) due to 
economic integration. But a reduction of transaction costs might also offer 
incentives to shift production to peripheral countries with a low-wage, well-
educated work-force. Thus, a competitive labour endowment combined with 
lowered transaction costs could be the decisive advantage of a peripheral location 
of production. These possible scenarios illustrate that economic integration is not 
necessarily correlated with a certain pattern of trade and production: it depends 
on the strength of the central and peripheral regions’ individual merits which 
direction the adjustment process will take in the course of economic integration. 
Having these integrations scenarios in mind, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have 





association with the EU has already removed barriers to trade in goods and 
services as to capital movements thus reducing transactions costs in trade with 
EU countries effectively; the Baltic workforce should fulfil the quality criteria 
applied by enterprises looking for locations suitable for labour-intensive 
productions. Accordingly, it can be expected that the Baltic trade statistics already 
mirror the closer economic relationship with the EU by a growing share of Baltic-
EU-trade. Furthermore, the Baltic integration scenario of EU full membership 
could be supplemented by an East European element: if access to large markets 
outside the EU influences the decisions on locating production (and/or related 
services), the Baltic states can profit from their geography and its former 
participation in the Soviet division of labour. Under these circumstances, history 
would play a role for the Baltic patterns of trade which should have a significant 
share of trade with the “Community of Independent States” (CIS), especially 
with Russia. West European trade and enterprise strategies on the one hand and 
historical ties and Baltic insider knowledge on the other hand would foster Baltic 
regional trade diversification. 
This means that history can matter for current trade patterns. The analysis of the 
regional arrangements’ influence on the Baltic patterns of trade falls too short if it 
is not taken into account that even before a regional association is formed the 
potential members could trade more with one another than otherwise predicted. 
The idea put forward by Eichengreen and Irwin (1996) is that past trade patterns 
influence current trade flows in a way that a passing historical event causes 
lasting cost reductions. A level of trade is generated greater than predicted by the 
scale and geographical distance of the markets, and the disproportionate level of 
trade continues over time. This kind of hysteresis in trade can be explained by a 
number of factors, in particular by a history of colonialism or migration or by a 





effects on trade with significant persistence.15 The permanent effects on the 
pattern of trade are associated with sunk costs of market entry and exit: prior to 
export sales it is necessary to invest in a distribution and sales network; thus the 
incentives to leave the market again after the shock passed by (e.g. a temporary 
appreciation) are rather small.16 It can be concluded that past trade flows can 
serve as an explanatory variable for current trade structures. 
                                         
15  According to Frankel and Rose (2000) e.g. a former colony-colonizer relationship leads to bilateral 
trade flows which are nine times higher as if such a historical tie did not exist. A common currency, a 
PTA and common policies result in flows being three times higher than normal. 
16  The model analysis of Baldwin (1988, 1989) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989) shows that 
sufficiently large exchange rate shocks can have persistent effects on trade prices and quantities: in 
the case of sunk market-entry costs domestic market structures can be altered thereby inducing 
hysteresis. Although empirical evidence of these model findings is rather weak, at least the 
fluctuations of the U.S. dollar in the early 80ies seem to support t he “persistent trade effect-
hypothesis”. Complementary model work was done by Dixit (1989) whose analysis at the industry 
level also shows hysteretic effects of exchange rate fluctuation when sunk costs are important for 





III. Emerging Regional Trade Patterns after Independence 
In the early nineties, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the central planning 
system was followed by a short but visible transformation crisis: real GDP 
decreased by two-digit rates in the Baltic states (Figure 1). But during the nineties 
Baltic economies recovered and positive growth rates turned up.  
Export and import volumes were closely correlated with economic growth. This 
means that the change of regional trade patterns analysed below took place in a 
period of growing export and import activities and it is not at all the result of a 
minimization of trade activities due to the breakdown of the socialist division of 
labour (Figure 2). 
Figure 1 — Economic Growth in the Baltic States after Independence (percentage 





















Figure 2 — Baltic Foreign Trade in the Course of Independence: 




































Source: Statistics Lithuania [a]; EBRD (1998); own composition. 
In 1991, the first year of internationally recognized independence, the trade 
statistics of the three Baltic states still reflected the era of intra-soviet trade and 
economic integration in the Baltic Sea’s Eastern rim region (Tables 1 and 2); 
foreign trade with EU countries was still of minor importance.  9 
 
Table 1 —  Developments in the Regional Trade Patterns of the Baltic States: Exports
a 
  Estonia  Latvia  Lithuania 
  1991  1995  1999  1992
g  1995  1999  1991  1995  1999 
(1) EU INTEGRATION                   
EU-15  3.7  54.0  62.7  39.9  39.2  48.3  3.0  36.4  50.1 
EU-27
b  15.5  68.0  77.0  49.1  53.1  66.2  13.2  51.1  71.4 
(2) REMAINING TIES WITH 
  TRANSFORMATION COUNTRIES 
                 
Baltic States  11.5  12.1  12.6  4.9  9.8  14.0  9.0  9.3  15.1 
Central & Eastern Eur. Countries
c  75.3  25.8  14.0  44.2  41.9  25.1  77.9  44.6  22.9 
Russia  56.5  17.7  9.2  26.0  26.7  12.4  57.0  20.4  7.0 
CIS  83.3  25.1  13.4  45.0  41.1  23.2  85.9  42.3  18.2 
(3) BALTIC SEA INTEGRATION                   
Baltic Sea Region  71.3  75.7  74.5  53.4  62.3  56.0  68.3  54.9  55.3 
West
d  3.2  44.7  52.1  20.2  23.2  26.9  1.6  21.3  28.6 
East
e  68.1  31.0  22.4  33.2  39.2  29.0  66.7  33.6  26.7 
(4) GLOBAL DIMENSION                   
Europe
f  90.5  94.5  92.8  89.5  93.0  89.5  90.2  93.5  90.9 
America  0.2  2.7  3.6  1.0  1.6  5.1  n.a.  1.2  5.3 
Asia  8.6  2.3  2.9  9.1  4.9  4.9  n.a.  5.2  3.5 
Africa  0.0  0.4  0.7  0.3  0.4  0.4  n.a.  0.1  0.1 
Australia/Oceania  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  n.a.  0.0  0.0 
a Percentage of total exports (general trade for 1995 and 1999). — 
b EU-15 plus countries already participating in accession negotiations: Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.— 
c Albania, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia. — 
d Included are Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden. — 
e Included are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia. — 
f Including Cyprus, but without the Caucasian states. 
— 
g Data for the year 1991 are not available in adequate quality. 
Source: Statistical Office of Estonia [a]; Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia [a]; Statistics Lithuania [a, b]; own calculations 
and compilation.  
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Table 2 —  Developments in the Regional Trade Patterns of the Baltic States: Imports
a 
  Estonia  Latvia  Lithuania 
  1991  1995  1999  1992
g  1995  1999  1991  1995  1999 
(1) EU INTEGRATION                   
EU-15  6.1  66.0  57.7  29.5  44.6  43.9  2.9  37.2  46.5 
EU-27
b  19.3  71.6  65.1  42.0  58.6  64.8  11.5  50.5  59.7 
(2) REMAINING TIES WITH 
  TRANSFORMATION COUNTRIES 
                 
Baltic States  11.5  3.6  3.8  9.5  10.1  13.6  6.5  4.9  3.5 
Central & Eastern Eur. Countries
c  63.4  19.9  18.9  39.0  28.6  30.1  70.5  47.0  33.8 
Russia  46.2  16.1  13.5  27.9  19.8  18.2  49.6  31.2  20.1 
CIS  73.8  18.8  17.0  37.6  33.0  28.1  83.8  42.0  24.4 
(3) BALTIC SEA INTEGRATION                   
Baltic Sea Region  62.0  74.5  64.2  60.9  63.6  65.5  58.8  65.2  56.9 
West
d  3.8  54.2  44.9  22.2  31.6  28.9  1.3  24.8  27.7 
East
e  58.2  20.3  19.3  38.6  32.0  36.6  57.5  40.4  29.2 
(4) GLOBAL DIMENSION                   
Europe
f  81.0  91.2  82.5  79.1  85.4  90.3  80.0  91.7  85.8 
America  3.8  3.4  5.1  3.9  3.0  1.9  n.a.  3.4  5.1 
Asia  13.9  5.3  10.3  4.6  10.8  7.6  n.a.  4.6  6.9 
Africa  0.0  0.1  1.9  0.4  0.1  0.1  n.a.  0.2  0.4 
Australia/Oceania  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.6  0.1  n.a.  0.1  0.1 
a Percentage of total imports (general trade for 1995 and 1999). — 
b EU-15 plus countries already participating in accession negotiations: Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.— 
c Albania, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia. — 
d Included are Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden. — 
e Included are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia. — 
f Including Cyprus, but without the Caucasian states. 
— 
g Data for the year 1991 are not available in adequate quality. 
Source: See Table 1; own calculations and compilation. 11 
 
But during the first half of the nineties this trade structure changed entirely: the 
EU-15 countries became the main trading partners of the Baltic states, although 
the development of bilateral trade structures reveals that the Baltic states are not a 
homogeneous group despite sharing a lot of common features. In comparison 
with Latvia and Lithuania the relative change in Estonian trade structures was 
much more distinct: very soon after independence trade with EU countries 
covered more than half of Estonian exports and imports. Also Latvia and 
Lithuania made use of the free trade agreements with the EU (the far reaching 
Europe agreements were signed in 1995), but on a lower level. Not surprisingly, 
it can be observed that with no exception EU markets are more important for 
Baltic exports than for imports because Baltic goods face a tougher competition 
on world markets than on EU markets. Moreover, Baltic EU exports and imports 
are far from being evenly distributed: trade intensity with the more developed 
Northern EU countries is significantly higher, especially with Baltic rim countries, 
than with the poorer European South. 
Although trade with former socialist countries lost importance, significant trade 
relationships continued — especially with Russia. The still important CIS trade 
reminds of the intra-Soviet division of labour and supports the hypothesis that 
the period of Soviet occupation had sustainable effects on Baltic trade patterns. 
Furthermore, in the Baltic Sea region the change of Baltic trade structures 
followed the changes in overall trade: trade relations with Western Baltic Sea 
countries intensified. As it was the case 70 years ago, the Baltic states’ efforts of 
integrating economically and politically in the Baltic Sea region were 
concentrated on the Western rim again, although economic ties with the Eastern 
rim, notably Russia, continued. Despite this common feature of Baltic integration 
patterns, the single Baltic states do not share the same main trading partners in 
the Baltic Sea region: Estonia’s main trading partners are Finland and Sweden, in 
addition Russian imports are of major importance; trade with Germany is most  
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important for Lithuania with respect to both exports and imports, imports from 
Russia count for 20 p.c.; Latvian exports concentrate on German and Russian 
markets, the same is true for Latvian imports. If total trade is analysed, these 
partner countries keep their status as main trading partners, thus underlining the 
importance of the Baltic Sea region for the Baltic countries. 
The trade analysis reveals that during the nineties the Baltic states made 
significant progress of integrating into the Western European division of labour. 
These changes would be even more obvious if for all of these countries special 
trade data were available. In contrast to special trade data, general trade data 
which had to be applied here cover a fraction of transit trade channelled through 
customs warehouses. As a consequence, especially trade with Russia gains 
outstanding importance due to this kind of transit trade. A comparison of special 
and general trade figures  — only possible for Latvia  — corroborates this 
presumption: Latvian exports to Russia decrease by six points, imports decrease 
by eight points; similar changes happen in the trade with other CIS countries. 
Vice versa, trade with EU countries appears to be more important and trade with 
Western Baltic Rim Countries to be dominant. Due to similar transit trade 
relationships with Russia, it seems plausible that Estonia’s and Lithuania’s special 
trade structures would be of the Latvian type. 
IV. Explaining Regional Integration of the Baltic States 
1. Historical Determinants of Current Baltic Trade Patterns 
The development of the Baltic states’ regional trade in the nineties supports the 
idea that history may play a special role for current Baltic trade relationships. 
Having in mind that Baltic exports and imports were close to 100 p.c. part of 
intra-soviet trade while integrated in the Soviet Union, the changes in regional 
trade patterns following independence show parallels to the development of  
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Baltic trade after World War I. In contrast to other Soviet successor states Baltic 
trade history does not only comprise the decades of centrally planned foreign 
trade during the Soviet era. After World War I the Baltic states became 
independent from the Russian empire and its successor state, the Soviet Union. 
Before independence they were economically tied together with the other Russian 
provinces, and their industries — especially rubber, textiles and iron producing 
plants — were oriented at Russian markets. Independence meant a radical change 
in trade relationships: the Soviet Union introduced a policy of becoming 
economically self-sufficient, which led to a sharp decrease of foreign trade and 
Baltic enterprises lost the majority of their “home markets”. However, loosening 
economic ties with Russia was in accordance with the Baltic states’ political 
efforts to strengthen their newly won independence from their mighty neighbour. 
Simultaneously, trade relationships with Western Europe were intensified, 
especially with Germany and the United Kingdom. Both countries developed 
economic but also political and cultural interests in the affairs of the Baltic states; 
other countries trying to gain influence in this region were France, Sweden and 
Poland.17  
Table 3 shows the interwar regional trade patterns which reflect the strategic 
change in the direction of economic integration: remembering that until the end 
of World War I the bulk of Baltic trade was Intra-Russian trade this change can 
be observed in the early twenties already. In 1922 the now Soviet Union was no 
longer a  major  trade partner of  any  Baltic  state while at least three quarter of  
                                         
17  See Walter (1937: pp. 5) and Laaser and Schrader (1992: pp. 200). 14 
 
Table 3 —  Historical Trade Patterns of the Baltic States 1922–1938 
  Estonia  Latvia  Lithuania 
  1922  1930  1938  1922-38  1922  1930  1938  1922-38  1922  1930  1938  1922-38 
Exports
a                         
EU-15  64,3  85,2  82,1  81,2  88,2  76,4  87,5  82,0  74,3  89,5  81,1  82,7 
EU-27
b  71,6  90,6  85,5  87,5  91,5  82,0  89,7  87,7  85,6  96,5  86,4  90,8 
Baltic States  6,5  4,2  2,0  5,4  3,2  4,1  1,6  3,8  11,3  6,9  1,2  6,4 
Baltic Sea Region  63,3  55,5  51,5  51,6  28,6  49,8  42,4  41,4  61,0  70,8  37,4  50,9 
West
c  30,3  45,6  43,9  39,3  18,5  30,3  37,1  29,6  37,6  62,4  30,5  41,0 
East
d  33,0  9,9  7,6  12,4  10,1  19,5  5,3  11,8  23,4  8,4  6,9  9,9 
Imports
a                         
EU-15  84,3  53,8  70,0  63,3  76,0  60,1  69,8  68,7  87,1  72,2  72,9  73,6 
EU-27
b  96,1  66,8  74,2  72,6  86,6  79,7  73,5  81,2  89,4  87,1  78,5  85,2 
Baltic States  4,5  2,7  1,1  3,3  7,1  4,4  2,0  4,8  2,0  5,4  1,7  3,8 
Baltic Sea Region  80,5  57,9  53,2  55,7  62,1  64,8  51,2  59,3  86,8  66,5  37,0  59,4 
West
c  67,3  37,5  45,4  41,8  51,0  43,0  44,1  44,0  84,5  53,3  28,5  48,6 
East
d  13,2  20,4  7,7  13,8  11,0  21,8  7,1  15,4  2,3  13,2  8,4  10,8 
a Percentage of total exports rsp. imports (general trade); due to aggregations in the available export and import statistics a negligible share of exports rsp. 
imports might have to be added to the trade blocs introduced above. — 
b EU-15 enlarged by countries already participating in accession negotiations: 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.— 
c Included are Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Norway, Sweden. — 
d Included are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia. 
Source:Bureau Central de Statistique de l’Estonie, various issues; Centralinis Statistikos Biuras, various issues ; Bureau de 
Statistique de l’Etat, various issues; own calculations and compilation.  
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exports and imports fell to the trade with today’s EU-15 countries (that share was 
only smaller for the Estonian exports due to a still high share of exports to the 
Soviet Union; but they rapidly declined in 1923). These patterns stabilized during 
the interwar period, though imports diversified to some degree. Thus the  Baltic  
trade  figures of  the  twenties and  thirties strongly reflect  the  westward 
orientation of the newly independent states and underline the Baltic efforts to 
strengthen the economic ties with today’s EU-15 countries. Trade relationships in 
those decades with countries now forming the group of EU-27 even indicate 
stronger historical economic ties with the European economic space. 
To be sure, Baltic trade with pre-war Western Europe was regionally concen-
trated: Estonia’s, Latvia’s and Lithuania’s participation in a Baltic Sea division of 
labour dominated their trade relationships. Although distance probably played an 
important role, political and cultural determinants of Baltic trade are obvious: 
most of the Baltic Sea trade was with Western partner countries, among them 
Germany as the main trading partner. Besides Baltic Sea trade the Baltic states 
trade with the United Kingdom was also of special importance. The obviously 
close Anglo-Baltic trade relationship points to British ambitions to become a 
political and economic player in this region which would have been otherwise 
part of an exclusively German sphere of influence. 
This analysis of Baltic regional trade patterns in the interwar period supports the 
hypothesis that history matters. More precisely: the economic history of the 
independent Baltic states can at least partly explain current Baltic efforts to 
participate in the EU integration process. Moreover, the present political and 
cultural situation of the Baltic states, which shows parallels to the development 
soon after World War I, and the collapse of the Russian empire recommends 
such a direction of economic integration. Nevertheless, more than four decades 
of Soviet occupation and integration in the Soviet division of labour also left its  
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mark in Baltic (economic) history. On the one hand the economic structures 
developed under Soviet central planning proved to be not competitive when 
Baltic markets were liberalized and opened for global competition (for details see 
Schrader, Laaser 1994). As a result of more rigorous reform policies than in 
other Soviet successor states  — especially in market-minded Estonia  — the 
painful though inevitable adjustment process which led to the collapse of Soviet-
style industries paved the way for more competitive structures. But on the other 
hand a core of trade relationships with former Soviet republics survived the 
transformation process thus giving some of the old industries the opportunity to 
stay in the markets. Moreover, the Baltic service sector benefited from the 
Russian demand for logistic services, especially in Baltic Sea trade (Böhme et al. 
1998). 
2. Regional Trade Concentration versus Dispersion 
The emerging regional trade patterns of the Baltic States during the nineties 
already gave evidence of the countries’ growing participation in the European 
division of labour after decades of isolation. It also became obvious that the EU 
integration of the Baltic states means to resume their interwar trade relationships 
and historical path of economic integration. Complementary to the analysis of 
Baltic regional trade, the quality of trade integration can be measured by trade 
entropy indicators which give information on the spatial concentration of trade 
relations. The rationale behind measuring the degree of spatial concentration of 
trade flows is the notion that a country which is trading with many other 
countries can be considered to be more deeply integrated into the international 
division of labour than a country trading with only a few partner countries. A 
country being „everybody’s darling“ in this sense is expected to be fully 
integrated into world markets, whereas a country with trade relations to only a 
few counterparts only cultivates limited economic contacts with the world  
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markets (Marwah 1995: 10). In the same manner the level of integration into the 
European division of labour can be evaluated. 
In numerical terms of a trade concentration indicator, trading with nearly 
everybody means relatively low and equally distributed shares of trading 
partners’ exports or imports in a country’s aggregate trade figures. In contrast, 
trading only with a few countries means unevenly distributed shares: some 
shares will be very high while the rest equals zero. Accordingly, a country with a 
low concentration record is considered being well integrated into the 
international trading community; in case of a high concentration record a 
country’s trade relations seem to be restricted to a small number of partners 
which could mean isolation. 
a. Methodological Remarks 
A specific indicator which is used in trade analyses to measure concentration or 
dispersion of trade flows is addressed under the heading of „trade entropy“.18 
The formula of the entropy index which has been derived to measure the spatial 
concentration of trade flows reads as follows, formula (1) being specified for 
import shares aij of trading partners j of country i and formula (2) for export 
shares bij respectively:19 
(1)  Imi =  ￿ aij ln(1/aij) with 0 < aij  < 1  and   ￿ aij = 1. 
                                         
18  Cf. Marwah (1995: 10), Marwah and Klein (1995), and Lundqvist and Persson (1998: pp. 63). The 
entropy indicator which is applied to international trade relations borrows its name from physics 
where it plays a central role in the second law of thermodynamics. Its econometric application comes 
from information theory and has taken its way also to various economic concentration problems, 
such as income distribution, market power analyses or international trade. In information theory, it is 
related to the expected information content of a message on an arbitrary event which may come true 
with a certain possibility. See Theil (1971: pp. 636) on details. 
19  Cf. the extensive explanations in Theil (1971: pp. 636) whose reasoning Marwah (1995: 10) takes as 
a starting point when constructing his trade entropy indicator.  
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(2)  Ixi =  ￿ bij ln(1/bij) with 0 < bij  < 1  and   ￿ bij = 1 
This formula measures the degree of dispersion of the statistical distribution of 
all aij (bij). It renders a suitable concentration indicator for our purpose because 
(i) it weights each single share aij (bij) by its relevance ln(1/aij) (ln (1/bij)) and (ii) 
it reaches its maximum value with all aij (bij) being equal. Hence, all single terms 
aij (bij), which are shares of ￿ aij = 1 (￿ bij = 1), have the same value in this 
situation of maximum entropy (or even distribution), whereas Im (Ix) will exhibit 
smaller values if the aij (bij) differ and some aij (bij) have substantially higher 
values than the rest of them. Extreme cases play only a marginal role when 
summed up in formulas (1) and (2), because very high aij (bij) are scaled down 
by multiplication with correspondingly low weights ln(1/aij) (ln (1/bij)), and for 
low aij (bij) the product with the weights ln(1/aij) (ln (1/bij) retains a low value 
because of the first term. On the other hand, medium and rather equally 
distributed aij (bij) values correspond with medium ln(1/aij) (ln (1/bij)) values and 
their products count relatively more in sum (1) or (2). 
While the name „entropy“ and the relevant formula are taken from information 
theory and applied here mainly in terms of usefulness, this application may also 
be justified by interpreting trade flows as messages conveying information 
according to Marwah (1995: 10). In this perspective, aij (bij) can be seen as the 
probability of the reporting country being integrated into the international 
business community by individual trade relations with partner country i, whereby 
the information content ln(1/aij) (ln (1/bij)) of this probability will be higher if i is 
not a unique case. 
b. Baltic Trade Entropies 
Applying this entropy formula, the geographical trade dispersion of the three 
Baltic states during the nineties is computed and compared with corresponding  
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figures for Germany as a benchmark, a country well integrated into the 
international division of labour. The results given in Table 4 need some 
additional comments: 
_  The entropy index for Baltic trade relations (both exports and imports) is 
computed with three different groups of countries: (1) Total Europe which 
also comprises the former Soviet Union and its various parts, and two sub-
groups of this entity, (2) EU-15, and (3) the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). With 
respect to these subgroups different developments seemed plausible. 
_  Complementary to absolute entropy its relation to the maximum entropy value 
in each case is computed; a relative entropy value of 1 would mean even 
distribution, The reason for the calculation of relative entropies is that the 
value of Im and Ix in case of maximum absolute entropy increases with the 
number of observations, in the given case with the number of trade relations.20 
Intertemporal or international comparisons would become difficult, in 
particular if the number of reported trading partners differs over time o r 
between national trade statistics. Some of these difficulties arose in the given  
data set: (1) the number of potential trading partners in Europe changed over 
time in the early 1990s due to the break-up of both the former Soviet Union 
and former Yugoslavia, (2) the various statistical offices of the reporting 
countries reacted differently on these events with respect to disaggregating  
trade  data  series,  (3) the general regional pattern offered by  
                                         
20  This may again be explained by the information theory roots of this formula: If for three cases (i = 3) 
the equal distribution is given by the probabilities 0.34, 0.33, and 0.33, the corresponding information 
content of these messages is substantial. But if we imagine ten cases with equal probabilities of 0.1 
then the expected information content is even higher because there is more uncertainty due to the 
lower probabilities (Theil 1971: pp. 640).  
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Table 4 — Trade Integration of the Baltic States into the European Division of 
Labour: Trade Entropy Indicators 
  Reporting Countries 
Partner Countries  Estonia  Latvia  Lithuania  Germany 
I. Import Entropy
a         
(1) Trade with Europe
b         
1991  0.48   (1.66)  0.65   (2.26)
e  0.39   (1.36)  0.80   (2.61) 
1993  0.62   (2.25)  0.63   (2.28)  0.50   (1.79)  0.76   (2.73) 
1995  0.62   (2.23)  0.73   (2.62)  0.69   (2.50)  0.76   (2.76) 
1997  0.67   (2.40)  0.73   (2.64)  0.71   (2.55)  0.77   (2.79) 
1999  0.68   (2.47)  0.75   (2.72)  0.74   (2.67)  0.78   (2.82) 
(2) Trade with EU-15         
1991  0.70   (1.86)  0.65   (2.26)
e  0.64   (1.69)  0.86   (2.21) 
1993  0.64   (1.69)  0.72   (1.90)  0.72   (1.90)  0.88   (2.25) 
1995  0.65   (1.71)  0.79   (2.07)  0.78   (2.07)  0.88   (2.25) 
1997  0.72   (1.90)  0.81   (2.14)  0.78   (2.07)  0.88   (2.25) 
1999  0.72   (1.91)  0.82   (2.16)  0.81   (2.14)  0.89   (2.27) 
(3) Trade with Baltic 
  Region
c 
       
1991  0.43   (0.94)  0.70   (1.54)
e  0.29   (0.63)  0.97   (1.74) 
1993  0.76   (1.67)  0.76   (1.67)  0.45   (0.99)  0.83   (1.83) 
1995  0.73   (1.59)  0.86   (1.89)  0.73   (1.61)  0.84   (1.85) 
1997  0.78   (1.72)  0.88   (1.93)  0.74   (1.63)  0.85   (1.86) 
1999  0.80   (1.76)  0.90   (1.98)  0.79   (1.74)  0.85   (1.86) 
II. Export Entropy
a         
(1) Trade with Europe
b         
1991  0.39   (1.33)  0.72   (2.50)
e  0.39   (1.33)  0.80   (2.61) 
1993  0.64   (2.31)  0.67   (2.40)  0.64   (2.31)  0.75   (2.71) 
1995  0.68   (2.45)  0.71   (2.56)  0.73   (2.63)  0.75   (2.73) 
1997  0.69   (2.48)  0.71   (2.55)  0.70   (2.53)  0.77   (2.79) 
1999  0.69   (2.49)  0.76   (2.74)  0.77   (2.77)  0.77   (2.78) 
(2) Trade with EU-15         
1991  0.49   (1.29)  0.78   (2.07)
e  0.78   (2.06)  0.87   (2.23) 
1993  0.63   (1.67)  0.76   (2.00)  0.78   (2.05)  0.87   (2.24) 
1995  0.68   (1.78)  0.80   (2.11)  0.78   (2.05)  0.87   (2.24) 
1997  0.70   (1.85)  0.78   (2.05)  0.81   (2.14)  0.88   (2.26) 
1999  0.70   (1.86)  0.79   (2.09)  0.81   (2.14)  0.88   (2.26) 
(3) Trade with Baltic 
  Region
c 
       
1991  0.35   (0.77)  0.72   (1.59)
e  0.30   (0.66)  0.95   (1.70) 
1993  0.82   (1.80)  0.70   (1.53)  0.67   (1.48)  0.82   (1.81) 
1995  0.86   (1.89)  0.79   (1.74)  0.78   (1.72)  0.83   (1.82) 
1997  0.87   (1.91)  0.78   (1.70)  0.74   (1.63)  0.84   (1.85) 




Table 4 (continued) 
a Import entropy indicators (based on Marwah, Klein (1995a, b)): the given values indicate relative 
import entropy  ( )
i i i m m m I I rI max / =  while values in parentheses indicate absolute import entropy 
i m I ; with 
(1)  ( ) ( ) ￿ =
j
ij ij m a a I
i / 1 ln ,  i ij ij M M a / = ,  1 = ￿
j
ij a ;  
(2)  J I i m ln max = ,  ij a J / 1 = ; 
where Mi are the total imports of the reporting country i from a selected region comprising J countries; 
Mij is the trade flow from a partner country j to the reporting country i; the import market share is aij. 
—
 b Including Cyprus but without the Caucasian states; without the Yugoslavian successor states and 
with Czechoslovakia in 1991; for this year the German trade statistics only include data on the trade 
with the Soviet Union as a whole, not with Soviet successor states. —
c Included are Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden. — 
d In analogy to footnote 
a export entropy indicators (also based on Marwah, Klein (1995a, b)) indicate values of the relative 
export entropy  ( )
i i i x x x I I rI max / = , values in parentheses indicate absolute export entropy  i x I : 
(1)  ( ) ( ) ￿ =
j
ij ij x b b I
i / 1 ln ,  i ij ij X X b / = , ￿ =1 ij b ; 
(2)  J I i x ln max = ,  ij b J / 1 = ; 
with total exports Xi , exports from i to j Xij  and export market share bij. — 
e 1992. 
Source: Statistical Office of Estonia [a]; Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia [a]; 
Statistics Lithuania [b]; Statistisches Bundesamt [a]; own calculations and 
compilation. 
national trade statistics varied from country to country anyway, and (4) the 
three subsets of Europe meant three different maximum entropy values. 
Turning to the results in Table 4, one is inclined to conclude that the degree of 
integration of the three Baltic countries into the European division of labour has 
substantially increased between 1991 and 1999, both in intertemporal comparison 
and in relation to the benchmark of Germany, as one could expect. The process 
of disintegration from the old Soviet type of distribution of labour should result 
in a greater dispersion of trade contacts (i) to a greater variety of countries and 
(ii) to more evenly distributed shares of trade flows with the partner countries.  
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In particular Estonia and Lithuania exhibit great increases in most of their relative 
import and export entropies21. In contrast, in four of six cases Latvia takes the 
lead in the even distribution of its import or export relations in 1999 — for 
imports from the BSR Latvia even reaches 0.90 — sometimes even 
outperforming Germany. In general, the difference in the degree of integration to 
the benchmark of the well integrated Germany is not significant. Interestingly, 
among the three Baltic states Estonia tends to lag behind the two others with 
respect to Europe as a whole and the EU-15 (it does not so with respect to the 
BSR). This indicates that Estonia still has a more distinct pattern of trade partners 
in these two regional groupings than Latvia or Lithuania. Given the high entropy 
value for Estonia’s trade relations with the BSR the country appears to be better 
integrated into this region than in the rest of Europe. 
Comparing the three different concepts of European trading partners the subsets 
EU-15 and BSR exhibit greater relative entropy values for each year than Europe 
as a whole. The largest values are obtained for imports from and exports to the 
BSR indicating the great opportunities and relatively low spatial transaction costs 
in this area of integration: While trade relations to the East were not abandoned 
completely new trading partners could be found at arms’ length just a few 
nautical miles away along the long established shipping lines across the Baltic 
Sea. Not surprisingly, trade facilitated by the Europe agreements is focussing on 
the neighbourhood regions rather than on „far-aways“ like Spain or Portugal. 
Summing up, the degree of integration of the three Baltic countries into the 
European division of labour as measured by entropy indicators obviously 
increased during the nineties, thus completing the picture of progressing 
integration drawn in the section before. At least with respect to the European 
                                         
21  With the exceptions of Estonian imports from and Lithuanian exports to the EU-15.  
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division of labour, the Baltic states have reached a fair degree of even 
distribution of their trade relations although trade appears to be concentrated to a 
certain degree. However, the entropy values do not answer the question which 
actual regional preferences exist. In particular, the trade entropy indicator is one-
dimensional, it ignores distances and suggests that trade flows from and to 
nearby countries should receive the same weight than those from and to far-
away-countries. Or, as Ghemawat (2001: 138) and Venables (2001: pp. 4 ) have 
put it: Distance still matters in the design of international trade patterns, even in 
the era of new information and communication technologies and e-commerce. 
Hence, entropy results should not be taken at face value: trading with everybody 
regardless of the partner’s location is rather unusual and a 100 p.c. entropy 
would mean a dimensionless world market without transport costs.22 Instead, 
distances should be explicitly taken into account in order to qualify entropy 
findings as it is done in gravity models which will be applied in the next section. 
3.  A Gravity Model to Explain Baltic Trade Relations 
a. The Merits of the Gravity Model Approach 
Gravity models are widely used in various economics disciplines to assess and 
forecast the impact of distance on the intensity of economic relations. 
Applications range from international economics, where trade patterns of 
countries (or groups of countries) are being explained by the gravitational forces 
of high incomes and population concentrations being located in relative 
                                         
22  Already Weber (1922) and again Isard (1949) have pointed to the fact that foreign trade theories 
generally ignore distance and t ransport costs as shaping factors. But models of new trade theory 
which are associated with Krugman (1991a, 1991b) under the heading of “geography and trade” do 
not have these deficiencies.  
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proximity,23 over regional economics, where the relative locational quality of a 
region within the overall network of transport, exchange and trade is to be 
assessed,24 down to urban economics with analyses of purchasing power flows in 
local retailing markets.25 Some researchers have claimed in the past that the 
application of the gravity model to economic interchange and trade would be 
without any foundation from trade theory26, but this view no longer holds. 
Deardorff (1995: pp. 9) found the gravity model to be consistent with a wide 
range of trade models including the Heckscher-Ohlin-model, either with 
frictionless or with impeded trade. 
The application of the gravity model in trade and integration analysis runs as 
follows: Gravitational forces to undertake economic interaction stem from high 
per-capita-incomes and population figures of trading partners, because these two 
features promise high revenues from business deals with numerous economically 
potent clients. But transport costs which vary with distance can be expected to 
impede the impact of the gravitational forces on the intensity of trade relations. 
Gravity models allow for testing the impact of various forms of distance: among 
them not only real geographical distances measured either by space or time, but 
also „virtual distances“ as exerted by tariff- or non-tariff-trade barriers, different 
languages, diversities in business cultures, traditions or economic systems. In 
technical terms, trade volumes are regressed on income, population and distance, 
with coefficients for the former variables normally being positive and negative 
for real or virtual distance. Empirical studies unanimously confirm that distance 
                                         
23  Cf. Deardorff (1995: pp. 5) who points out that the idea of applying gravity models to trade analyses 
originates in Tinbergen (1962) and has a long tradition since then. Venables (2001: pp. 4) cites 
impressive evidence that gravity models are not confined to analysis of trade flows. They can 
likewise be applied to foreign direct investment flows as well as to technology transfer. 
24  See Keeble et al. (1981, 1982). 
25  A recent example can be found in van Suntum (2000). 
26  Deardorff (1995: 1) refers to this arguments without citing names.  
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still matters in global trading while lowering real or virtual distance barriers 
intensifies mutual integration of markets. Even the rapid decline of information 
and telecommunication costs did not result in a “death of distance” (Ghemawat 
2001: 138).27 
Gravity models for the Baltic Sea Region have been put forward in particular by 
Byers et al. (2000: pp. 78) and Cornett and Iversen (1998: pp. 7). Byers et al. 
(2000) estimate hypothetical coefficients from recent trade data of the 
Scandinavian countries in order to predict future trade volumes and country 
shares of the Baltic countries. They argue that in historical comparison there are 
many similarities between Scandinavian and Baltic countries in the interwar-
period, including trade patterns and income levels. Cornett and Iversen (1998) try 
to estimate future trade in the Baltic Rim by relying on the complete sample of 
bilateral trade relations between the European Union and Central and Eastern 
European accession candidates. They control for different phases of integration 
in order to differentiate between various forms of trade barriers typical for the 
different forms of bilateral trade links. Both studies are rather convincing in 
explaining trade in the BSR by the trading partners’ attractiveness (incomes and 
population), proximity and PTA’s. Encouraged by these promising results of 
gravity models for the BSR, the following analysis tries to explain existing Baltic 
countries’ trade patterns by the different forms of real and virtual distance.  
On the one hand, the Baltic countries’ progress to integrate into the European 
Union is evident. Estonia is — by virtue of its distinct transformation progress — 
member of the first group of applicant countries the EU started negotiations with. 
                                         
27  Browsing through recent integration literature reveals a great variety of applications of different 
specifications of the gravity model to issues of integration and disintegration. A random choice may 
be given by the works of Baldwin (1994), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995), Eichengreen and Irwin 
(1996), Soloaga and Winters (1999), Djankov and Freund (2000), and Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2000).  
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Latvia and Lithuania have been rated somewhat below but they were invited to 
join the second group of candidates. Since all three countries lowered their 
institutional trade barriers and now have rather liberal trade regimes vis-a-vis the 
EU — again Estonia  has settled the most liberal regime in this group — the 
virtual distance to EU members was reduced significantly. Whether this 
development is reflected in actual trade flows can be analysed by a gravity model 
with an appropriate design. 
On the other hand, although trade relations with the CIS lost importance old ties 
and acquired knowledge on market conditions and business culture may qualify 
the Baltic states for still more than negligible trade contacts with the East — thus 
forming a bridge to the CIS. Keeping in mind the findings of Eichengreen and 
Irwin (1996) that historical ties in trade relations may last rather long and are able 
to create path-dependencies, another subject of the gravity analysis is to assess 
the field of tension between „going westward“ and „keeping tied to the East“. 
b. Gravity Model Specification 
The model specification follows conventional paths in the literature. Dependent 
variable are trade flows, either imports Mij or exports Xij, of the Baltic countries 
(with subscript i indicating the Baltic countries and j their trading partners). The 
import and export equations in logarithmic form read as follows (with  r, s  
representing the error terms): 
(1) lnMij = Constm + m1lnGNPPCi + m2lnPOPi + m3lnGNPPCj + m4lnPOPj + m5lnDISTij 
+ m5+klnDUMk + … + r. 
(2) lnXij = Constx + x1lnGNPPCi + x2lnPOPi + x3lnGNPPCj+ x4lnPOPj + x5lnDISTij 
+ x5+k lnDUMk + … + s. 
The independent variables cover the Baltic countries’ and their trading partners’ 
per-capita-incomes and population figures (GNPPCi, GNPPCj, POPi, POPj) as  
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gravitational forces, and the real distance DISTij between the Baltic capitals and 
the capitals of the trading partners as impeding transportation costs factor. 
Moreover, up to six dummy variables are included to control for different kinds 
of virtual distances or proximities (e.g. common border28, EU agreements and 
other trade agreements) (see also Box 1). 
The choice of the dummy variables reflects the specific situation of the three 
Baltic countries with respect to the different dimensions of distance: 
_  INTRABALT can be expected to capture (1) the impact of the common 
border, (2) the common past within the former Soviet type of division of 
labour, and (3) the early free trade agreements between Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania. 
_  With FORMSOV the hypothetical path dependency in trade relations of 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with the former Soviet Union, i.e. now the CIS, 
is depicted. 
_  BALTSEA refers to the location of a country in the BSR.29 This variable is a 
specific contiguity dummy because  trade in the  BSR has ever been different 
                                         
28  A common border normally facilitates trade, because trade between neighbours is less impeded by 
transaction costs if no transit via third countries with additional bureaucratic procedures is required 
(Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc 2000: 4). The common border dummy usually is referred to as „contiguity“ 
(Eichengreen and Irwin 1996: pp. 15). 
29  In order to create profile-free dummy series, the Russian Federation was not incorporated in 
BALTSEA because its impact is already measured in FORMSOV.  
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Box 1 —  The Gravity Model: Explanations of Variables  
GNPPCi   GNP per capita of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
POPi   Population of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
GNPPCj  GNP per capita of trading partners 
POPj  Population of trading partners 
DISTij  Distance “as the crow flies” between Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania and 
trading partner 
INTRABALT  Dummy variable, = 1, if trade flow between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 
= 0, if not 
FORMSOV  Dummy variable, = 1, if trading partner was member of the Former Soviet 
Union (excluding Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), = 0, if not 
BALTSEA  Dummy variable, = 1, if trading partner belongs to Baltic Sea Region 
(excluding Russian Federation), = 0, if not 
FEEDERWEST  Dummy variable, = 1, if trading partner participates in Baltic Sea transport 
feedering network (excluding Russian Federation), = 0, if not 
SCAND  Dummy variable, =1, if trading partner is either Denmark, Norway, Sweden 
or Finland, = 0, if not 
ARAHBHH  Dummy variable, = 1, if trading partner is either Belgium, the Netherlands, 
or Germany, = 0, if not 
RESTEU  Dummy variable, = 1, if trading partner is member of EU15, but not already 
covered by FEEDERWEST, = 0, if not 
ACCCEEC  Dummy variable, = 1, if trading partner is EU applicant from Central and 
Eastern Europe (excluding Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), = 0, if not 
 
from other regions due to the Baltic Sea as a natural transport resource. The 
Baltic Sea as an intensely utilized device for saving transport costs should 
have an impact on regional integration.30 
_  With the alternative dummy FEEDERWEST, this potential influence of the 
Baltic Sea is depicted in an even more pronounced manner. Going beyond the 
group of BSR countries in BALTSEA these dummies take also the value of 1 
if the  trading partner is the Netherlands or Belgium. This is motivated by 
                                         
30 For details see Böhme et al. (1998) and Böhme (1987, 1988).  
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recent structural change in Baltic Sea maritime transport.31 To account for this 
change the dummy FEEDERWEST is included instead of BALTSEA. In order 
to differentiate between trade flows to and from the Scandinavian countries 
and the other Western participants of this feeder system the profile-free 
dummy series SCAND and ARAHBHH were alternatively introduced. 
_  As a consequence of the Europe Agreements trading barriers between the 
Baltic countries and the EU were lowered substantially. To control for this 
effect RESTEU was added to the equation: it comprises all trade flows with 
those EU-members which are not already included in the BALTSEA, 
FEEDERWEST, SCAND or ARAHBHH series. 
_  Moreover, trade agreements between the various EU-applicants are spreading 
out rapidly (Byers et al. 2000: pp. 83). In particular for the intra-applicant 
trade one should expect some momentum from the ongoing institutional 
integration and the Europe agreements. To capture this effect the dummy 
ACCCEEC was added to the equation. 
_  In contrast to other gravity model estimates, in particular for larger samples of 
countries, no language dummy was included as is usually done to control for 
transactions costs savings due to the common use of widely spoken languages 
as national language.32 Due to the lack of significant linguistic similarities 
between the Baltic countries and their neighbours such a dummy would not 
have any explanatory power. 
                                         
31  Since the political turnabout in Eastern Europe the pattern of maritime services in the Eastern Baltic 
Sea has changed considerably. Direct liner services between former COMECON ports and the rest of 
the world have been substituted more and more by transshipment of containerized cargo (“feeder 
services”) via North Sea ports (Hamburg and Bremen in Germany and their Benelux counterparts in 
the so-called ARA-range (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerpen)) a pattern which has emerged in the 
Western Baltic Sea much earlier (Böhme et al. 1998: pp. 51).  
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The estimation has been processed in subsequent steps beginning with equation 
(1) which refers to the BALTSEA dummy. In subsequent steps BALTSEA was 
substituted first by FEEDERWEST, afterwards by SCAND and ARAHBHH. This 
procedure served at the same time as a kind of stability analysis. 
c. Data Set 
Trade flow data have been taken from the same sample as the one which was 
deployed in the preceding paragraphs, i.e. from Baltic countries’ national 
statistical offices’ trade data (see sources of Tables 1 and 2). Estonia’s and 
Lithuania’s trade data are collected according to the concept of “general trade”, 
whereas Latvia applies the concept of “special trade”. In this paper a joint 
database of the three countries’ statistical offices is used in which Latvian data 
are recalculated according to the “general trade”-concept in order to achieve 
comparability. “General trade” is the more comprehensive concept because it also 
covers goods which are only imported to customs warehouses in order to be 
transhipped to other countries without processing them. This is the reason why 
in these trade figures a fraction of Russian trade is covered because the Baltic 
ports are important transit points for Russian sea-borne trade as already 
illustrated for the case of Latvia (see Chapter II).33 However, a comparable 
database according to the “special trade”-concept was not available.34  
                                                                                                                               
32  Such cultural dummies are included by Soloaga and Winters (1999: 5) or by Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc 
(2000: pp. 4). 
33  This may be illustrated by the fact that in 1990: 30 per cent of Russia’s international seatrade was 
handled through Baltic ports. The share of Russian transit cargo in Baltic ports’ turnover ranged in 
the 1990s from 60-65 p.c. in Estonia to 85-90 p.c. in Latvia, with Lithuania lying in-between this 
range (Böhme et al. 1998: pp. 43 and 49). 
34  It should be noted that international trade data bases, such as IMF’s direction of trade statistics or UN 
trade handbook report only the national statistics, i.e. “general trade” for Estonia and Lithuania and 
“special trade” for Latvia. Using these sources would mean to compare apples with pears. With 
respect to Estonian foreign trade statistics the methodology changed in 2000: since January 1
st foreign 
trade data are generally published in accordance with the special trade system.  
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For trading partners on distant continents only those trade flows were 
incorporated which were above 1 mill. US-$ and which could clearly be 
identified at the country level whereas „rest of ...“-files were skipped because no 
country-specific distance could be assigned to them. But the regional coverage 
remained high anyway as can be seen from Table 5. Two years were selected: 
1995, the first year for which more or less reliable and comparable data in 
sufficient regional disaggregation could be obtained, and 1999 with the most 
recent data. It was expected that the results would improve from 1995 to 1999 
because (1) trade statistics should have become more reliable in the course of 
transformation and association to the EU and (2) the progressing institutional 
change in the course of transformation process should make the Baltic 
economies more receptive to the gravitational forces of free trade. 
Per-capita-incomes and population data have been taken from “The World Bank 
Atlas” (World Bank var. iss.); for the distance matrix the “Bali Indonesia Travel 
Portal” (http://www.indo.com/distance/index) was used which provides a fast 
and comprehensive distance calculator for a great variety of towns and locations 
worldwide or, alternatively,  for exact  latitudes  and  longitudes of any  place in  
 
Table 5 —   Share of Baltic States’ Imports and Exports Covered by Trading 
Partners’ Sample for Gravity Model Estimates (p.c.) 
  Imports    Exports   
  1995  1999  1995  1999 
Estonia  99.1  97.5  99.3  98.6 
Latvia  98.6  99.6  99.1  98.7 
Lithuania  98.7  96.8  99.5  99.4 
Source: See Table 1; own calculations.  
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the world;35 information on the scope of trade agreements of the Baltic countries 
have been taken from Schrader and Laaser (1998a, b, c; 1999); the dummies 
BALTSEA, FEEDERWEST, SCAND, and ARAHBHH have been constructed 
according to the information provided in Böhme et al. (1998). 
d. Results of the Gravity Model 
The estimates for the import and export equations for the two years 1995 and 
1999 are presented in Tables 6 – 9. The intention was to find out if or to what 
extent a gravity model can explain the Baltic trade flows in the first years of their 
‘return to Europe’ as it is a common practice for other industrialized countries. 
Hence, the results in Tables 6 – 9 should give an answer to the question whether 
the Baltic countries’ trade relations are adjusting themselves to patterns which 
can be found for other countries in the course of an integration process. It should 
be noted that in all cases the logarithmic form of the equations proved to provide 
a much better fit to the data than an alternative formulation with absolute values. 
1995: Dominance of Specific Determinants 
Looking at the Baltic countries’ imports in 1995, it can be observed that in the 
different configurations (1) to (3) the coefficients of per capita incomes GNPPCj 
and population POPj of the trading partners and the distance variable DISTij 
show the correct sign and prove to be highly significant (at 1 per cent error level) 
(Table 6)36.  The coefficients are by far larger for per capita incomes of trading 
partners than for population figures37 thus revealing that imports of the Baltic 
countries originate mainly from rich trading partners. Estonia, Latvia and 
                                         
35  According to Byers et al. (2000: 80) the underlying data stem from the University of Michigan. 
36 In Tables 6–9 t-values are White-corrected. 
37  Please note that the coefficients of log variables can be interpreted as elasticities, which allows to 
compare their size irrespective of scale factors.  
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Lithuania can be thought upon being in a phase of catching-up with normal trade 
relations with the wealthy industrial nations. But even in this process economic 
distance plays its usual role as can be inferred from the DISTij coefficient of –0.7 
to –0.8. 
It is no surprise that the (relatively low) income and population figures of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania themselves turned out to be insignificant.38 
However, the INTRABALT dummy for trade relations between the three Baltic 
countries shows an extremely high elasticity of 5 to 6 at a high significance level, 
thus indicating close ties between these countries. Moreover, the FORMSOV 
dummy has a high elasticity of above 4 which displays that the traces of  the  
former  Soviet division of labour are still present in the  Baltic  
                                         
38  An attempt not documented here to skip both variables from the equation decreased the adjusted R² 
somewhat without improving the overall fit.  
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  Equation No. 
Variable
b  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Coeff.  (t-value)  Coeff.  (t-value)  Coeff.  (t-value) 
Constant  -22.54  (-2.11)**  -22,67  (-2.15)**  -22.99  (-2.18)** 
GNPPCi  0.66  (0.51)  0.66  (0.52)  0.66  (0.52) 
POPi  0.47  (1.36)  0.48  (1.42)  0.48  (1.43) 
GNPPCj  2.34  (11.13)***  2.23  (10.84)***  2.24  (10.84)*** 
POPj  0.87  (11.16)***  0.86  (10.95)***  0.87  (10.90)*** 
DISTij  -0.83  (-4.09)***  -0.71  (-3.38)***  -0.68  (-3.12)*** 
INTRABALT  5.63  (8.48)***  5.93  (8.78)***  6.02  (8.59)*** 
FORMSOV  4.30  (7.11)***  4.37  (7.26)***  4.42  (7.24)*** 
BALTSEA  1.68  (3.77)***  —  —  —  — 
FEEDERWEST  —  —  1.98  (4.56)***  —  — 
SCAND  —  —  —  —  2.24  (4.04)*** 
ARAHBHH  —  —  —  —  1.75  (4.82)*** 
RESTEU  0.07  (0.24)  0.36  (1.07)  0.38  (1.12) 
ACCCEEC  2.25  (4.47)***  2.47  (4.79)***  2.52  (4.77)*** 
2 R   0.63  0.64  0.64 









Jarque-Bera test  71.27***  80.27***  81.07*** 
t-values in brackets are corrected according to the White heteroskedasticity concept: 
*** statistically significant at 1 p.c. error level 
** statistically significant at 5 p.c. error level 
* statistically significant at 10 p.c. error level 
+ statistically significant slightly above the 10 p.c. error level 
a Dependent variable: lnMij (= Imports of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania from trading partners) 
b Independent variables, with exception of dummies, in natural logarithms (ln). 
Source: See Table 1; own calculations.  
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countries’ i mport patterns; energy imports are of major importance in this 
respect.39 Another finding is that the two contiguity (or common border) 
dummies, BALTSEA and its refined version FEEDERWEST, are highly 
significant and show high coefficient values in equations (1) and (2). Obviously 
the Baltic countries’ imports are dominated by short-distance regional trade both 
in the Baltic Sea Region and in the Baltic/North Sea maritime feeder system. The 
alternative dummies BALTSEA or FEEDERWEST must be interpreted as the 
refined versions of the standard common border dummy in other gravity 
regressions. The relatively high coefficients and high significance levels indicate 
that the Baltic Sea — and even more the Baltic/North Sea feeder system — must 
be regarded as a less hampering barrier than a normal land border between two 
countries. The above cited notion of the Baltic Sea being an efficient link 
between the countries on its shore rather than a barrier to trade is mirrored by the 
data.40 
Furthermore, it appears to be interesting that the dummy for the other EU 
members RESTEU is insignificant. Apparently, the EU integration of the Baltic 
countries was realized via the Baltic Sea neighbourhood in 1995. In contrast to 
this lack of integration, significant import links existed with the other Central and 
Eastern European applicant countries as the ACCCEEC dummy reveals. 
In general, all three equations have a sufficient F-record to remain below the 1 
per cent error level. The adjusted R
2, with 0.63 to 0.64, is somewhat below the 
level of 0.8 which can be reached in other gravity regressions but on average this 
                                         
39  However, as has been said in the data section, it cannot completely be ruled out that FORMSOV also 
captures a fraction of genuine Russian trade flows going not immediately as transit through Baltic 
ports but are stored in customs warehouses for some time. 
40  If FEEDERWEST is split into its parts SCAND (for Scandinavia) and ARAHBHH (for Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Germany hosting the main hub ports) as it is done in equation (3) it becomes clear 
that the closer ties on the Baltic states’ import side, however, existed with Scandinavia in 1995.  
 
36
level seems acceptable.41 The regressions suffer from not normally distributed 
residuals according to the Jarque-Bera test. However, this effect can be smoothed 
down towards insignificance if some polar cases of unusual trade relations are 
controlled for by dummies or eliminated from the sample.42 The data sample 
reveals that these polar cases are largely confined either to Balkan states plagued 
by war or to some specific Far East trading partners. Hence, without these polar 
cases the equations appear to render tolerable results. 
On the Baltic  export side a similar picture emerged for 1995 (Table 7). The 
equations are significant and a slightly greater portion of variations can  be 
explained by the independent variables. The problem of not normally distributed 
residuals also accrues to the export equation, but result again from some unusual 
trade relations to Asia and could be controlled by dummies. Per capita incomes 
GNPPCj and p opulation POPj, i.e. market size, of trading partners apparently 
exercise significant gravitational forces on Baltic states’ export flows whereas the 
distance variable DISTij exhibits a highly significant normal value of around –1. 
Compared to imports in the same year the elasticity of GNPPCj is distinctly lower 
and that of DISTij higher. Both observations meet with expectations derived from 
the state of economic development of the Baltic states: while they import 
sophisticated products from technological leaders around the world, their exports 
have not achieved a similar position on world markets yet. The income elasticity 
of trading partners with values of 1.6 – 1.7 appears to be high anyway compared 
to average values of below 1.0 in larger samples of countries.  However,  it  
should  be  no surprise  that  the  exports  of  
                                         
41  See Frankel and Rose (2000) on this issue. 
42  The  2 R  also improves in this case that is not reported here.  
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  Equation No. 
Variable
b  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Coeff.  (t-value)  Coeff.  (t-value)  Coeff.  (t-value) 
Constant  -13.60  (-1.37)  -13.87  (-1.44)  -13.79  (-1.43) 
GNPPCi  0.42  (0.37)  0.42  (0.38)  0.42  (0.38) 
POPi  1.00  (3.35)***  1.01  (3.48)***  1.01  (3.47)*** 
GNPPCj  1.76  (7.34)***  1.64  (7.02)***  1.63  (6.97)*** 
POPj  0.74  (8.66)***  0.72  (8,45)***  0.72  (8.29)*** 
DISTij  -1.08  (-6.69)***  -0.93  (-5.92)***  -0.93  (-5.64)*** 
INTRABALT  4.80  (7.80)***  5.19  (8.68)***  5.18  (8.24)*** 
FORMSOV  3.98  (7.77)***  4.08  (8.25)***  4.07  (8.09)*** 
BALTSEA  1.44  (3.73)***  —  —  —  — 
FEEDERWEST  —  —  1.95  (5.26)***  —  — 
SCAND  —  —  —  —  1.90  (4.08)*** 
ARAHBHH  —  —  —  —  1.99  (5.84)*** 
RESTEU  -0.06  (-0.14)  0.29  (0.69)  0.29  (0.68) 
ACCCEEC  1.17  (2.70)***  1.45  (3.39)***  1.44  (3.27)*** 
2 R   0.66  0.67  0.67 









Jarque-Bera test  31.45***  38.03***  38.06*** 
t-values in brackets are corrected according to the White heteroskedasticity concept: 
*** statistically significant at 1 p.c. error level 
** statistically significant at 5 p.c. error level 
* statistically significant at 10 p.c. error level 
+ statistically significant slightly above the 10 p.c. error level 
a Dependent variable: lnXij (= Exports of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania to trading partners) 
b Independent variables, with exception of dummies, in natural logarithms (ln). 
Source: See Table 1; own calculations.  
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Baltic states are growing faster than incomes of trading partners: after the long 
period of autarky under the Soviet system a catching-up process started which is 
also featured by outstanding export growth rates. Moreover, the intense local 
integration between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well as the historical ties 
with CIS states are also corroborated in the export equation with extreme (but 
somewhat lower) elasticities for INTRABALT and FORMSOV. Again, in the 
case of Lithuania energy products contribute to this effect significantly. 
The dummies BALTSEA and FEEDERWEST again have a high explanatory 
power and significance level, FEEDERWEST exhibiting an improved 
performance vis-à-vis BALTSEA.  Apparently, the Baltic countries’ exports are 
going primarily to Scandinavia and to the Western members of the Baltic/North 
Sea feeder system. Finally, the insignificance of the rest of EU-members 
(RESTEU) and close ties to other applicant countries (ACCCEEC) are once more 
confirmed by the export equation. Hence, the European integration of the Baltic 
states in 1995 primarily took place via the Baltic Sea and with applicant countries. 
1999: Following the Gravitational Forces 
Compared to 1995, the results of the gravity model analysis for Baltic trade in 
1999 (Table 8: imports, Table 9: exports) corroborate the previous findings. The 
adjusted R² records improved for imports and remained stable for exports 
compared to 1995. These findings suggest that the regional pattern of Baltic trade 
slowly adjusts to the gravitational forces which normally shape international 
trade relations.  However,  the problem of not normally distributed   
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  Equation No. 
Variable
b  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Coeff.  (t-value)  Coeff.  (t-value)  Coeff.  (t-value) 
Constant  -18.32  (-1.32)  -18.45  (-1.35)  -18.83  (-1.37) 
GNPPCi  0.85  (0.55)  0.86  (0.57)  0.86  (0.57) 
POPi  0.36  (0.42)  0.37  (0.85)  0.38  (0.86) 
GNPPCj  1.79  (11.60)***  1.71  (10.81)***  1.71  (10.84)*** 
POPj  0.99  (17.02)***  0.97  (16.70)***  0.97  (16.68)*** 
DISTij  -0.87  (-6.44)***  -0.79  (-5.73)***  -0.77  (-5.36)*** 
INTRABALT  3.97  (10.09)***  4.20  (10.47)***  4.29  (10.36)*** 
FORMSOV  2.44  (6.71)***  2.49  (6.90)***  2.52  (6.95)*** 
BALTSEA  1.33  (4.22)***  —  —  —  — 
FEEDERWEST  —  —  1.54  (4.94)***  —  — 
SCAND  —  —  —  —  1.79  (4.80)*** 
ARAHBHH  —  —  —  —  1.30  (4.63)*** 
RESTEU  0.08  (0.32)  0.29  (1.08)  0.31  (1.15) 
ACCCEEC  0.99  (3.14)***  1.18  (3.57)***  1.22  (3.65)*** 
2 R   0.72  0.73  0.73 









Jarque-Bera test  32.94***  35.51***  37.31*** 
t-values in brackets are corrected according to the White heteroskedasticity concept: 
*** statistically significant at 1 p.c. error level 
** statistically significant at 5 p.c. error level 
* statistically significant at 10 p.c. error level 
+ statistically significant slightly above the 10 p.c. error level 
a Dependent variable: lnMij (= Imports of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania from trading partners). 
b Independent variables, with exception of dummies, in natural logarithms (ln). 
c No computation possible due to square root of negative number. 
Source: See Table 1; own calculations.  
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  Equation No. 
Variable
b  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Coeff.  (t-value)  Coeff.  (t-value)  Coeff.  (t-value) 
Constant  19.17  (1.44)  19.22  (1.47)  19.17  (1.36) 
GNPPCi  -2.89  (-1.98)**  -2.90  (-2.02)**  -2.91  (-1.88)* 
POPi  -1.07  (-2.02)**  -1.06  (-2.03)**  -1.06  (-2.18)** 
GNPPCj  1.56  (8.66)***  1.46  (8.09)***  1.46  (8.91)*** 
POPj  0.76  (9.02)***  0.74  (8.83)***  0.75  (11.17)*** 
DISTij  -1.03  (-5.51)***  -0.93  (-5.02)***  -0.92  (-5.52)*** 
INTRABALT  4.01  (7.77)***  4.31  (8.32)***  4.32  (5.91)*** 
FORMSOV  2.60  (6.58)***  2.65  (6.88)***  2.66  (7.27)*** 
BALTSEA  1.35  (3.49)***  —  —  —  — 
FEEDERWEST  —  —  1.68  (4.76)***  —  — 
SCAND  —  —  —  —  1.73  (3.06)*** 
ARAHBHH  —  —  —  —  1.63  (2.94)*** 
RESTEU  0.13  (0.42)  0.39  (1.20)  0.39  (1.07) 
ACCCEEC  0.03  (0.07)  0.25  (0.71)  0.26  (0.64) 
2 R   0.65  0.66  0.66 









Jarque-Bera test  34.36***  36.63***  36.55*** 
t-values in brackets are corrected according to the White heteroskedasticity concept: 
*** statistically significant at 1 p.c. error level 
** statistically significant at 5 p.c. error level 
* statistically significant at 10 p.c. error level 
+ statistically significant slightly above the 10 p.c. error level 
a Dependent variable: lnXij (= Exports of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania to trading partners) 
b Independent variables, with exception of dummies, in natural logarithms (ln). 
Source: See Table 1; own calculations.  
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residuals remains in place,  which  again  could  be  controlled  by  dummies for 
countries being in state of war (Yugoslavian successor states) and for exceptional 
close ties to some partners in Far East.43  
Again, per-capita-incomes and population of trading partners exhibit positive 
coefficients and distance a negative coefficient, all highly significant below the 1 
per cent error level. The main difference between the results for 1995 and those   
for   1999  can  be   found    in   the  smaller   coefficients  for   GNPPCj, 
INTRABALT, FORMSOV, BALTSEA and FEEDERWEST. Both catching-up in 
trade relations and local and historical ties are somewhat weakening, although 
still substantial and significant. 
A surprising finding is that the integration with EU members not covered by 
BALTSEA/FEEDERWEST remained insignificant, although in 1999 the so-called 
“Europe Agreements” had been effective for 4 years. By the Europe Agreements 
a state close to free trade between the Baltic countries and the EU members had 
been realized. This substantial reduction in institutional trade barriers should 
have been reflected in the data of Baltic trade flows for 1999. Hence, the EU 
Agreements have up to now not changed Baltic trade patterns in a perceptible 
manner  — neither on the import nor on the export side. In addition, on the 
export side the ACCCEEC variable covering the ties with other applicant 
countries became rather weak. Together with the weakening of the other 
elasticities as mentioned above this may indicate a growing regional trade 
diversification. 
                                         
43   A second test not reported here was computed without these extreme cases which exhibited normal 
features and a much higher  2 R  of 0.8. In this test also Luxemburg was excluded, whose trade 
relations with the Baltic states are surprisingly weak. The reason behind this may lie in the structure 
of goods  which could be exchanged with Luxemburg. For countries on the first stages of 




However, the remaining driving forces FEEDERWEST and FORMSOV are still 
able to explain a substantial portion of Baltic trade flows for shorter distances in 
conjunction with normal income, population and distance variables for aggregate 
trade. Moreover, in 1999 trade with Scandinavia became more important than 
with Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands — especially on the import side. 
The conclusion can be drawn that Baltic trade begins to adjust to the normal 
gravitational forces of income and large markets and the repelling effect of 
distance to trading partners. Nevertheless specific forces with regional effects are 
still at work which have to be incorporated into the analysis. 
An Attempt to Explain Baltic Trade Patterns 
To tell the story behind these results means to consider several components 
which coincide and reinforce each other: 
Baltic imports and exports both for 1995 and 1999 are receptive to the appeal of 
incomes and population of trading partners and decrease with growing distances. 
But residual problems suggest that the gravitational forces have not yet taken 
over full control. Moreover, a significant share of Baltic trade cannot be 
explained with the standard notion of common borders; specific explanations are 
needed to cover the impact of proximity and low barriers to trade. 
One of these  specific explanations is the temporal proximity to close trade 
relations in the past. As Eichengreen and Irwin (1996) observed, historical trade 
relations leave their traces in trade patterns for longer periods than usually  
expected. According to their findings path dependencies are a common feature of 
many countries’ regional trade patterns. 44 Although the historical component in 
                                         
44  Eichengreen and Irwin (1996: pp. 21) analyse (a) the bilateral trade patterns of a greater number of 
countries with each other and (b) capture the historical component by introducing lagged trade data 
from previous decades as additional independent variables.  
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this paper is less sophisticated than in the Eichengreen/Irvin approach, the results 
demonstrate that the forced integration in the Soviet division of labour after 
World War II still has a substantial and lasting influence on Baltic trade patterns 
despite the shrinking shares of CIS trade. The smaller trade shares in conjunction 
with the high coefficient of FORMSOV indicate that the impact of CIS trade is 
quite substantial compared to the low income levels of these trading partners; in 
the special case of Lithuania the impact of energy exports and imports is decisive. 
The other specific variable, representing geographic proximity, can be found in 
the BALTSEA/FEEDERWEST/SCAND/ARAHBHH dummy family. These 
dummies are a more sophisticated expression of the standard distance variable. 
Taking into account (i) the intensively utilized system of Baltic Sea maritime 
transport, (ii) the by far lower unit transport costs in maritime transport than in 
land or air transport,45 and (iii) the rather short travelling times across the Baltic 
Sea, one may well interpret these dummies as representatives of the notion that 
the Baltic Sea is a spot without any substantial geographic expanse. In other 
words: trade relations across the Baltic Sea may be regarded as coming close to 
standard textbook models of international trade which generally ignore distance 
and transport costs as shaping factors. Trade relations of the Baltic countries with 
their Baltic Sea neighbours appear to be as intense as if these countries were 
located just a nautical mile off the territorial waters of their trading partners on 
the Baltic rim. 
Another finding is that the FEEDERWEST dummy, which also covers trade with 
Belgium and the Netherlands in addition to Baltic Sea trade, outperformed the 
BALTSEA dummy. The Baltic Sea/North Sea feedering system from/to the hub 
                                         
45  According to empirical results referred to in Venables (2001:12) transport on overland routes is on 
average 7 times more expensive than on sea routes.  
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ports in the ARA range, Bremen and Hamburg mainly serves the intercontinental 
transport needs of all the Baltic rim countries. It could be possible that this 
system directs trade of the Baltic states to those trading partners where these hub 
ports are located. The relatively small volume of Baltic states’ own exports and 
imports — as compared to Russian or Scandinavian trade flows which mainly 
benefit from the feeder system — might be transported on this feeder system as 
by-loads on the same vessels at more or less marginal costs also beyond the 
immediate Baltic Sea Region to the Benelux countries. In other words, the Baltic 
Sea Region comprises all countries in which the vessels of the feeder system are 
making port calls, not only the countries on the Baltic rim. The existence of a 
well organized transport system permitting fast and low costs transport relations 
seems to shape the Baltic countries’ trade flows. 
Finally, it is of major interest that the process of EU association was not reflected 
in the regression. Instead, regional determinants clearly dominated the results 
despite the expectation that the trade agreements with the EU would have 
fostered Baltic-EU trade flows in general. But trade with the Non-Baltic Sea 
members of the EU was much weaker than with Baltic Sea members (Germany, 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland) even a fter controlling for market size and 
distance. Hence, one may conclude that in the case of the Baltic countries (i) the 
process of European integration mainly runs via their Baltic Rim neighbours, (ii) 
the Baltic Sea is a major integrating device for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and 
(iii) the transport system dominates the trade regime by shaping trade flows in 
this region. 
V. Summary and Conclusions 
The analysis of the Baltic export and import performance by regions already 
made clear that the Baltic states’ integration into the Western European of labour 
progressed significantly during the nineties. This development reminds on the  
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period soon after World War I when the Baltic states had become independent 
from Russia and started an integration process directed towards Western Europe. 
In this respect EU integration means reintegration into regional markets to which 
a historical affinity exists. But history also matters with respect to the period of 
Soviet occupation: traces of the Soviet division of labour are still visible in the 
Baltic trade patterns; and the Russian transit trade via Baltic ports contributes a 
major share to the value added of these countries’ service sectors. These findings 
give rise to the impression that the Baltic states could serve as a bridge between 
the two Europes, having the stronger pier on the Western shore. 
The trade entropy analysis for the Baltic export and import flows corroborates 
the finding that during the nineties the degree of integration into the EU and the 
Baltic Sea region increased. This picture of European integration with a regional 
centre of gravity is confirmed by the gravity analysis which in addition took real 
and virtual distances into account. The gravity model estimates suggest that 
Estonia’s, Latvia’s and  Lithuania’s trade flows with the rest of the world are 
starting to develop along the usual lines as in other regions of the world. More 
and more they follow the gravitational forces  that generally shape trade relations. 
But in the specific case of these three countries regional integration is much more 
intense than it is normally observed. With their ports being important transit 
points for Russian foreign trade, the transport cost saving potential of the Baltic 
Sea is much more important for shaping their regional trade pattern than the 
institutional integration into the EU via the association agreements. In this 
particular case the transport system’s influence seems to dominate the trade 
regime’s influence. 
Nevertheless, regardless of this specific dimension of economic integration 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have made considerable progress on their road to 
Europe. Their regional trade patterns already have undergone substantial 
changes. This result raises additional questions for further research, in particular  
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for the qualitative dimension of the integration process and for the Baltic states’ 
specific role in the network of international trading relations: Do the Baltic states 
have the potential to qualify for the role of attractive production sites, either 
being workbenches for standardized products or gaining ground in the 
production of technologically more advanced commodities? Is internal structural 
change sufficient to provide options for a greater variety of internationally 
competitive products? To what extent will these changes affect the Baltic states’ 
function as a bridge towards the large markets of the Russian Federation, a role 
which geography suggests? These issues seem to be crucial for assessing 
Estonia’s, Latvia’s, and Lithuania’s progress properly. They will be addressed in 
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